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Abstract:  
This article summarizes research on the natural knowledge of God and the construal of sacred 
doctrine in question one of the Summa Theologiae and chapter 1 of Thomas's Romans 
commentary, with a comparison to Karl Barth. It takes as its challenge and motivation to uncover 
some of the affinities (indeed, to create a convergence) between Karl Barth and Thomas Aquinas 
just where both modern Barthians and modern Thomists would have thought convergence least 
likely: on the natural knowledge of God. It seeks to do so on the basis of their reading of Romans 
1:20 in Barth's Shorter Commenta and Thomas's Super epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos? where 
each of them ends up saying surprising things about the natural knowledge of God under the 
pressure of following Paul. Part II of the article simply asserts the reading of Thomas on Romans 
and takes theologian's licence to do so in theses defended elsewhere. Part III makes the 
comparison of the two commentaries (Barth's and Thomas's), arguing a convergence, and it too 
concludes in theses. Some readers may find the procedure circular. If so, I can only hope the 
circle is attractive enough to make them curious enough to seek more information. Part of what I 
hope to do is provide a reading of Thomas's theological procedure that resembles in a smaller 
way Barth's account of Anselm's. 
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Article: 
I. Introduction  
This article summarizes research on the natural knowledge of God and the construal of sacred 
doctrine in question one of the Summa Theologiae and chapter 1 of Thomas's Romans 
commentary, with a comparison to Karl Barth.1 It takes as its challenge and motivation to 
uncover some of the affinities (indeed, to create a convergence) between Karl Barth and Thomas 
Aquinas just where both modern Barthians and modern Thomists would have thought 
convergence least likely: on the natural knowledge of God. It seeks to do so on the basis of their 
reading of Romans 1:20 in Barth's Shorter Commentary2 and Thomas's Super epistolam S. Pauli 
ad Romanos? where each of them ends up saying surprising things about the natural knowledge 
of God under the pressure of following Paul.4 Part II of the article simply asserts the reading of 
Thomas on Romans and takes theologian's licence to do so in theses defended elsewhere.5 Part 
III makes the comparison of the two commentaries (Barth's and Thomas's), arguing a 
convergence, and it too concludes in theses.6 Some readers may find the procedure circular. If so, 
I can only hope the circle is attractive enough to make them curious enough to seek more 
information. Part of what I hope to do is provide a reading of Thomas's theological procedure 
that resembles in a smaller way Barth's account of Anselm's.7  
Such a reading is significant because Barth is at once the most intrepid recent defender of the 
sort of scripturalism that I believe Thomas to share, and a most confident detractor of Thomas on 
the grounds that Thomas deserts that scripturalism for the natural theology Barth abhors. To the 
extent that I can defend the suggestion, made occasionally by Michel Corbin, of a convergence 
rather than an opposition between Thomas and Barth,81 will have helped to change the terms of 
the debate. 
The clash is promising. The Five Ways of Summa theologiae 1.2.3, arguments in favor of the 
proposition "God exists," have constituted for a millennium the now celebrated now notorious 
now controverted now all-too-plain climax of natural theology.9 Barth sums up one evaluation of 
them as follows:  
Natural theology was able,... after the rediscovery of Aristotle, to get the upper hand over 
medieval theology, which at last and finally became apparent in the formulas of the First Vatican 
Council (in the canonization of Thomas Aquinas as its supreme achievement [Spitzenleistung]). 
Since the comment comes in the midst of a portrait of natural theology as dogmatics' most 
virulent disease, wherein the castigation of the analogia entis as "the invention of the Antichrist" 
has been repeated only a few pages earlier,11 Barth's characterization of Thomas's achievement as 
a "Spitzenleistung" becomes a superlative of disapprobation. The summit reached becomes that 
of a tower of Babel.  
Yet where something very like the natural theology of the Five Ways appears in the Super 
epístolas Sancii Pauli ad Romanos lectura, it cannot be functioning as a Spitzenleistung of any 
sort of natural theology of which Barth could disapprove. In a letter at the end of his life, Barth 
writes: "On the contrary, I would gladly concede that nature does objectively offer a proof of 
God, though the human being overlooks or misunderstands it. Yet I would not venture to say the 
same of natural science, whether ancient or modern."12 If that is the division, then Thomas's 
arguments belong on the side of "nature" rather than on the side of "natural science," because for 
Thomas, concrete nature is already shot through with grace, and Barth's notions of science, both 
ancient and modern, are held captive to modern notions of a natural science that defines itself as 
immanent to this world. But when Thomas defines natural science in his commentary on the 
Prologue to John, it comes under sacred doctrine, serves the doctrine of creation, and remains 
open to the explication of the world as having a source and an intelligibility that transcend it. 
"Natural science," he writes, "considers things as proceeding from God."13 Obviously that is not 
the sort of "natural science" Barth had in mind. And in Barth's own Shorter Commentary on 
Romans (which Barth intends to match the account in the Dogmatics and enjoys the advantages 
of brevity and verse-by-verse organization), an explicit openness to natural theology appears 
which, however narrow and hedged, only leaves a space for the sort of natural theology that 
Thomas offers. It is indeed for just that hedged and narrow open space, with just such conditions 
as those on which Barth places the emphasis, that Thomas offers a natural theology—one that 
looks to twentieth-century eyes more like a theology of revelation. For it is objectively 
trinitarian, and it requires faith to be effective. 
When Barth arrives in his commentary at Romans 1:20, he finds himself compelled to admit, 
with caveats and reversals, that  
the world which has always been around [the Gentiles], has always been God's work and as such 
God's witness to himself. Objectively the Gentiles have always had the opportunity of knowing 
God, his invisible being, his eternal power and godhead. And again, objectively speaking, they 
have always known him. In all that they have known otherwise, God as the Creator of all things 
has always been objectively speaking the proper and real object of their knowledge, exactly in 
the same sense as undoubtedly the Jews in their law were objectively dealing with God's 
revelation.1 
In some ways that statement sounds as if it goes far beyond what Thomas would say. Barth does 
not distinguish God's essence where Thomas would, for example. In other ways, Barth's attempt 
to qualify his claim by dialectic rather than distinction will cause him to seem to take it back.  
The discipline of having to follow Paul (within, to be sure, a certain very broad tradition of 
interpretation which they themselves help to define) will make each of them, Barth and Thomas, 
model his presentation of certain issues in natural theology less upon his own situation and 
preferences than he does in his more systematic works, and more, instead, upon the perceived 
moves of Paul. That presentation will in turn render more visible theological similarities of 
argument, agenda, and approach that situations and circumstances might otherwise becloud. 
Barth and Thomas will each seek to execute what we may call the "material moves of Paul."15 
Thus by "material convergence" I mean in this case just such a pattern of argument as Paul 
executes first and Barth and Thomas follow, as it were, at a distance.16 
I seek to discern a common underlying pattern just when differences of vocabulary, emphasis, 
and time threaten to cover it. Under the influence of Paul their common teacher, Thomas will 
talk about the ineffectiveness of natural knowledge of God under certain sinful conditions and 
how it serves to prove the necessity and sufficiency of grace, conditions that go unmen-tioned in 
the tightly circumscribed article on the Five Ways; under the same influence Barth will talk 
about the possibility of an objective natural knowledge of God, a possibility that goes 
unmentioned in the differently directed polemic of Church Dogmatics 1,2 and 11,1, except to 
seem denied. Each must intentionally or unintentionally press his own questions upon Romans, 
but Romans will in turn with greater or lesser influence press its questions upon each one. It is by 
attending to the latter pressure—that of Romans, or of a tradition of reading it, upon its 
commentators17—that I hope to discern a convergence in the matter of natural theology. Natural 
theology as a Christian discipline finds its home, both Barth and Thomas would agree, in 
Romans 1. Indeed even Thomas deploys the phrase "theologia naturalis" there, in one out of two 
places, and the connotations are every bit as negative, even if his opponents are inevitably 
different and his tone characteristically milder.18  
Specifically, I am aiming for the scriptural warrant for the Five Ways. For if there is one place in 
the Summa where the skeptic sees Thomas's script-uralism in retreat, it is in the Five Ways. 
Generations of students have passed over question one (the nature of sacred doctrine) to give 
pride of place to question two (the existence of its object). In so doing they neatly if unwittingly 
substitute the logic of coming to believe for the logic of belief,19 which question one has 
specified. It is question two read as if in isolation that functions to define the scientific character 
of Thomas's theology, and it is a very different scientific character from the one I will argue is to 
be found in question one. Gilson for example regards it as "extremely important" that those 
things that are "purely rational" in Christian beliefs "can be extracted from their theological 
context and judged, from the point of view of natural reason, as purely philosophical 
conclusions." Furthermore, that "enables us to understand how strictly metaphysical knowledge 
can be included in a theological structure without losing its purely philosophical nature."20 Such 
a reading provides an immediate challenge to readings like mine (including those of Corbin and 
Preller). For one might find the criterion of consistency reversible. One might argue, that is, that 
a certain other reading of question two tells us what Thomas's "real" intention is, and that 
question one ought to be read so as to cohere with that, instead of the other way around. It is one 
purpose of the theses that occupy Part II to make readings like mine more nearly irreversible by 
putting question two into its scriptural context. 
The symmetry is striking: Thomas's warrant for the Five Ways (precisely: for the demonstrability 
of God's existence at 1.2.2) is Romans 1:20, and in Thomas's Romans commentary—Super 
epistolam Sancì Pauli ad Romanos lectura—at 1:20 there appear similar cosmological 
arguments.21 If we put the commentary on Romans, chapter one, verses nineteen to twenty-one, 
into context, we will have put Thomas's natural theology into context, even in its most prominent 
form. If scripturalist considerations control the claims for the natural knowledge of God in the 
commentary where it is at home, and we take seriously the instructions of the Summa's prologue 
to read it as a compendium and abbreviation of matters that arise in commentary on scripture,22 
then they also control the claims for the natural knowledge of God in question two, and the 
burden of proof becomes much heavier upon the nonscripturalist reading. 
II. Conclusions About the Natural Cognition of God From Thomas's Romans Commentary  
1. There is in Thomas's Romans commentary a paradigmatic use of the natural cognition of God 
which occurs with fiducial faith23 in the context of  
justice, piety, gratitude, and finally the infused grace of charity.24 This is the cognition of God 
that sacred doctrine uses and turns into wine.  
2. There is a defective use of the natural cognition of God which occurs without faith in the 
context of injustice, impiety, ingratitude, and finally the direction of the will away from God. 
This is the cognition of God that every concrete, existing Gentile25 seems to have according to 
the Romans commentary, the cognition of God that cries out for the grace of the gospel (In Rom. 
1:166, #97) of Jesus Christ (#102).26 Otherwise it is wine into vinegar.  
Is there no third, neutral use? 
3. The Enlightenment imagines neutral human beings, neither delivered up to injustice, impiety, 
and ingratitude, nor religious enthusiasts; it imagines human beings who disengage their wills 
from their knowing. Thomas does mention human beings "with no will to believe except on the 
basis of proof" (ST II-II.2.10 ad 1). Even the love of truth, however, is a movement of the will 
toward the good. Having no will to believe can, for Thomas, only reflect a flight from the good, 
an aversion of desire from it. Those rational creatures with no will to believe except on the basis 
of proof whom Thomas accords more than a mention are already those with no will to believe 
even in the face of proof. Those who wait upon intellectual coercion, until they are "in some way 
driven [coacta] by the evidence" are the demons who believe and tremble (II.II.5.2. ad 1). Even 
those who debate with infideles "not supposing the truth of the faith as certain," or "as 
//"doubting" commit a sin, although to do so for refuting errors (to the opponent's good) or as 
practice (to the good of the debating believer who lets herself be corrected), is laudable (II-
II.10.7c and ad 3). 
4. But does Thomas not in fact mount just such a neutral project in the Summa contra gentiles? If 
Michel Corbin is right, the answer is yes and no.27 Thomas mounts some such project, but he 
leaves it uncompleted. He changes course mid-work. Either he cannot carry it through, or he 
intended merely to adopt the pose of neutrality, switching later to a conceptuality incompatible 
with neutrality, and anticipates that of the Summa, which exemplifies the first, paradigmatic use 
of the natural knowledge of God. It is neither irrational nor cynical to pursue the latter course. 
Thomas does not take up the pose of the sincere doubter, so as to deceive readers about his 
commitments, but takes up a temporary position, as a teacher, which he will pull up from behind 
him like a used ladder. Thomas begins in the Summa contra gentiles with a strategic and 
temporary, self-consuming division of the truth into two modes. When he moves them toward 
coherence, however, he moves the use of the natural cognition of God away from neutrality 
toward the use that obtains under the conditions of faith. In so doing he mimics in the academic 
presentation of theology what happens in the life of a convert. The coherence of a life is able to 
be constructed only in retrospect. Similarly the penultimate (this-worldly) coherence possible for 
arguments asserting the proposition "God exists" comes only within sacred doctrine. Thomas 
merely begins with a fragment that looks quite different in its final context. Either we must say 
that the Summa contra gentiles executes its transition to another genre as an intentional rhetorical 
trope, one that seeks not to trick but to sublate, and deliberately turns water into wine; or we 
must say that Thomas allows the project of the Contra gentiles to fall into a category mistake. If 
we allow Thomas the charity of the first interpretation, we will see that the awkwardness of the 
transition comes from its prospective arrangement: in retrospect it makes sense. The miracle of 
water into wine makes sense, after all, only after the fact, when it forms part of a gospel narrative 
that seeks to tell the story of Jesus. From the standpoint of the water, if you like, the transition to 
wine is entirely opaque. 
The Enlightenment and its neo-Thomist critics mistook the project of the beginning of the 
Summa contra gentiles for something that controlled the interpretation of Thomas's entire corpus, 
including the Summa theologiae, because it seemed to accord well with their own project. 
Perhaps it was all but inevitable that they should do so. But that Summa belongs to a manifestly 
different genre from that of the beginning (at least) of the Contra gentiles.  
5. The discussion of the natural knowledge of God in its integral form— as objectively 
trinitarian28 and as issuing effectively in justice, piety, and gratitude—represents nature as 
completed and perfected by grace. Under conditions of sin, the completion and perfection of 
nature by grace involve the redemption that comes to the faithful. 
Some background is in order for a claim about the much controverted relation of nature and 
grace. I follow Otto Pesch. Adam was created with nature and, out of God's superabundant 
mercies, in grace (ST 1.95.1), or in a state of "original justice" (1.100.1). Grace was not 
constitutive of nature, any more than standing upright is constitutive of a human body; but being 
stood upright was both a good o/the body and a gift to the body, the loss of which could not be 
restored by the body itself. As Pesch puts it: "Original righteousness is a good of nature, in that it 
neither altered nor added to its constituents; it is a 'supernatural/ 'gracious' gift to nature, because 
it cannot be made available by nature's own power."29 Like life itself (strictly, in terms of God's 
gift of a soul), it could be passed on, but not recovered once lost.30 Pesch comes to a careful 
conclusion. The "essence" of original sin "does not consist, like actual sins, in the loss of grace 
..., but in the loss of the due harmony of nature [granted, a harmony worked by supernatural gift]. 
Fallen nature is sinful not because it has no grace, but because it is unready— 'indisposed'—for 
grace."31 Likewise bodies once dead decay and are shortly no longer disposed for life (or a soul). 
The result is that Thomas knows no cases of pure nature, neither ungraced nor Unfällen, just as 
we know no cases of abstract bodies, in some state of suspended readiness for life, neither alive 
nor undecayed. Although both abstract nature and unsouled bodies are logical possibilities, the 
real possibilities are nature graced or failed, bodies living or decaying. If I am right about 
Thomas's contrast, then it shows up  
in the Romans commentary when he uses Paul's later life as an example of nature in good 
working order, nature under grace, an example to which he devotes the Prologue to his 
commentary on the epistles, and when he uses Paul's Gentiles as an example of nature manqué.32  
6. Cognitio naturalis is always and everywhere cognitio naturalis gratia evangelica Christi (my 
phrase in Thomas's words; cf. #97, 102:) namely natural cognition by the grace of the gospel of 
Christ: for without the grace of Christ working in advance we would have died outside Eden. But 
it comes in two forms: "detained" and redeemed.33  
At ST I-II.109.1 Thomas affirms that a human being can have a cognition of something true 
without grace: This does not deny that a human being still lives and knows by the grace of 
creation, but it affirms that some knowledge is possible without the grace of elevation.34 The two 
are one grace, one plan of God, broken in its execution by human sin.  
Concrete or alloyed (as opposed to pure) nature in this plan of God's (as opposed to some other 
possible plan that God did not choose) is nothing other than the grace of elevation working in 
advance, proleptically, under conditions of sin, to keep us alive and functioning until God's plan 
proceeds; it is not a human power so much as a divine mercy, no less so if we fail to recognize it 
as such. As a mercy under conditions of sin it is already not only God's elevating grace persisting 
because of God's remaining true to God's own purpose and promise; it is already God's saving 
grace. Otto Pesch puts it this way: 
It is easy to overlook: the justification of the sinner is no "new" dispensation of God's, but the 
carrying out of God's creatorly will over against the rebellious human creature. The dimensions 
of nature that remain undisturbed are therefore to be conceived of as the effectiveness already in 
advance \Vorauswirksamkeit\ of the grace that saves.35  
So nature is a cross-section of God's plan. We misunderstand it if we consider it on its own. We 
must take the viewpoint of the whole, whether from creation forward, or from the eschaton back. 
From creation forward we see concrete nature as the persistence (in the face of obstacles) of 
God's gracious plan to take us beyond ourselves to be God's friends. From the eschaton back we 
see concrete nature as the anticipation (despite obstacles) of that same plan. It would be odd (if 
not violent) for God to befriend us without respect for our temporal condition; therefore we must 
not be surprised if God's purpose of befriending us has temporal, and to us in time therefore 
anticipatory effects. Glory follows grace just as what is first in intention is last in execution. 
After the fall, nature can be understood only in terms of what lies before and after it. Nature, 
under conditions of original justice granted and lost, is God's not foreclosing on the plan of 
creation, and God's not preventing the anticipation of elevation, or a place for the plan to be 
carried out, and the execution to begin. 
Thus Thomas's affirmation of cognition "without grace" praises the persistence of God's 
intention even before its execution. It does not set human knowing apart from God. It affirms 
what we may call cognüio naturalis detenta. Thomas's affirmation does a knowledge that denies 
the glory of God, and fails to issue in gratitude, the courtesy of calling it by what it has been and 
might be. In calling it in virtue of what it has been, the affirmation accuses it of failure, and 
recalls it to its vocation. In so doing, the affirmation refuses to deny the cognition to the intellect, 
just so that it can assign the subtraction to the will.  
We Gentiles have "subtracted from God's knowledge" {In Rom. 1:21, #127) as we have rejected 
God's aid, so that our knowledge fails to form us as our nature fails to hold us upright. Through 
injustice and ingratitude we confine ourselves to cognitio Dei subtracta, that is, a cognition of 
God without the ramifications or the full coherence that faith requires, without fiducia (#129). 
That is because we have been "a scientia Dei subtrahentes," (#127), i.e., holders of a 
cognoscitive habit without the deeds and attitudes of charity (In Rom. 1:17, ##105-108), like the 
justice, gratitude, and piety here mentioned. Without those Godward and God-given attitudes 
like those Thomas finds in Paul (Prologue, ##1-3), we lose too the cognition's objective 
trinitarian coherence. 
For convenience we can invent technical terms that imitate or keep close to Thomas's language. 
Call the defective form "cognitio detenta," after the Pauline phrase "they detained the truth in 
unrighteousness" of Rom. 1:18 (cf. ##111-112,127-130); or "cognitio subtracta," since it results 
from subtracting from or insulting the power and scientia that God possesses, on which it should 
depend (cf. #127). Call the full form "cognitio iustitia formata," to reflect the commentary's 
constant preoccupation with justice (occasioned by Paul's), and to show the parallel to "faith 
formed by love." Or call it more briefly "cognitio integra," in contrast to "detenta" or 
"subtracta"', or "cognitio evangelica," a phrase that appears at paragraph #103 in explication of 
the "ex fide in fidem" passage, since it is the cognition of the gratia evangelica that Thomas 
make the theme of the entire letter (In 1:16b, #97); or "cognitio salutifera," after the phrase at In 
I Cor. 1:21, #55. Or borrow Thomas's description of what it is supposed to accomplish and call it 
"cognitio vera, which leads human beings to the good" (In Rom. 1:18, #112).  
7. Thomas says in the Romans commentary that we have the faith of which he speaks only under 
the condition of trusting God, but note that he does not exclude the possibility of also in 
appropriate cases trusting human reasons and natural signs; only they are "not yet" faith if they 
are all we trust (In Rom. 4:3, #327; cf. ST II-II.2.2). They are precisely in that sense of "not yet" 
preambles. Contrary to popular belief, preambles are "pre-" not because they are foundational (in 
the sense of logically prior or more generally accessible), but because they are serviceable (in the 
sense of standing at sacred doctrine's disposal.)36 They are things that may become faith; in that 
sense, as possible manuduction for the faithful, they precede it; but they need not. And should 
they be taken up into faith, they contribute nothing to it, for faith properly so called depends 
upon nothing else than trusting God. Still, we can distinguish preambles from things that could 
not be taken up into faith, such as "God is a creature."  
The contrast between preambles and articles, within limits, is relative. Some things will never be 
susceptible of proof. Other things must be susceptible of proof, because the scriptures tell us so 
reliably. Still other things do not have that status specified. Both preambles and articles come 
into sacred doctrine under the conditions specified by their lying sub ratione Dei or by their 
status as revelabilia. That is, a verbally identical demonstration will function differently in the 
theology that pertains to metaphysics from the theology that pertains to sacred doctrine (1.1.1), 
because the context that specifies the use and therefore the meaning of the words will differ (cf. 
II—II.2.2 ad 3 on philosophers' use of "God"). The context proper to sacred doctrine is specified 
by the formal rationale of trusting God (ST 1.1.3, etc.). 
The contrast between preambles and apparently demonstrated articles, or between serviceably 
and unserviceably demonstrated truths, however, is sharper. At 1.46.2 Thomas lists no fewer 
than eight apparently demonstrative arguments for the proposition that the world had a beginning 
instead of having always existed. Were the presence of a demonstrative argument enough, 
Thomas would have to consider it a preamble that the world had a beginning. But Thomas 
knows, as 1.1.1 has it, that even demonstrations sometimes turn out to have an "admixture of 
error." Therefore he does not rely upon them, but upon the Creed. What counts as preamble does 
not depend upon what science demonstrates: "And this is useful to consider, lest perchance 
anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should adduce insufficient reasons, which 
would provide material for ridicule among the infidels, finding us believing for such reasons the 
things that are of faith."37 Since it is the creed rather than the state of metaphysics that tells 
Thomas what is demonstrable and what not, he goes on to find errors in each of the 
demonstrations. He would have had to look for errors in the Five Ways, too—and would also 
have found them38—had revelation not guaranteed that some such ways would work. And the 
fact that most people today would not consider them to work would bother Thomas, would 
"provide material for ridicule" among the cultured despisers, only if Thomas's argument in 1.2.3 
actually depended upon the cogency of the demonstrations. But it does not. It depends formally 
on trusting what God says (1.1.8), in Rom. 1:20 (1.2.2, sed contra), as 1.46.2 depends on what 
God says in the Creed. In both places we have apparently valid demonstrations. In both cases 
Thomas is prepared in principle and in advance to find the demonstrations mistaken. In both 
cases we nowadays tend to find them mistaken. The fact that Thomas tends to find one set 
mistaken and another set not has to do not with the contingent state of human learning, but with 
the authority of scripture, when well interpreted, to judge it (1.1.6 ad 2). Only if he judges it 
capable—yes in the case of whether God exists, no in the case of whether the world had a 
beginning—does he then use it "as an architect uses builders, a citizen a soldier" for the "easier 
leading by the hand" (manuductio) of our defective intellects (1.1.6 ad 2). That then is the 
difference between demonstrations that serve as preambles and those that do not: sacred 
doctrine's formal rationale tells Thomas which secular arguments overlapping with sacred 
doctrine's matter will prove serviceable and which not. Preambles do not prove their own 
serviceability; that depends on how sacred doctrine presses them into service.  
The interpretation of preambles in terms of serviceability, or in Thomas's terms, as 
manuductions, gives us no reason to deny that if a preamble is Aristotelianly demonstrated 
cognitio, then it must count in some non-equivocal sense as scientia. It counts as scientia in 
metaphysics, for example. And just if our use of the word "scientia" is not to equivocate, then 
there must be some continuity between the scientific character of preambles in metaphysics and 
some scientific character in sacred doctrine, even if they are strictly extraneous to it (ST 1.1.8). 
Otherwise scientific character fades in and out according to discipline, one sealed hermetically 
off from another. Then not only theology, but all sciences are fideistic. The difference between 
the current interpretation of the status of preambles in the Summa and other possible 
interpretations is that rival interpretations tend to articulate the continuity of scientific character 
from the bottom up. For many of them, preambles are the paradigms of demonstration which 
sacred doctrine must match. 
According to the interpretation defended here, however, the order is reversed. The paradigm of 
demonstration is the "demonstration of the Father" by Jesus Christ, "who, as a human being, is 
the 'demonstration' [via] stretched out for us into God" (ST I, proemium to q. 2).39 According to 
the philosophy of science implicit in the Summa, it is other scientific disciplines that mimic that. 
The scientific character of other, Aristotelian demonstrations comes from the top down; to call 
Aristotelian and christoform arguments both "demonstrations" and both "scientific" is not 
equivocal, according to sacred doctrine, just because Aristotelian demonstrations too participate 
in the Logos by analogy. The "other" viae—the quinqué viae—do not represent the paradigm of 
demonstration. Rather Thomas's theological appropriation of the Five Ways saves our 
penultimate and provisional demonstrations from equivo-city, from not counting as 
demonstrations after all. The appropriation saves our cognitio subtracta, the cognition we have 
generally and for the most part, which was enough for Aristotle, but which Thomas relegates to 
the theology that belongs to metaphysics. The appropriation saves the Five Ways by taking them 
up into the realm of revelabilia, in which, through God-bestowed faith, they are joined with the 
first truth they cannot otherwise reach. The Five Ways are caused to assert the unGod-
forsakenness of nature under conditions short of the will's assent to God. They are caused to 
assert the unGod-forsakenness of nature even in conditions of a will's dissent from God. In so 
doing they save Paul's usage; they save cognitio subtracta. And in so doing they claim the world 
for the realm of revelabilia. The point is not that Aristotle is outside the realm of the revelata; he 
is led by the hand into the world of revelabilia.  
The second form of cognitio naturalis gratia evangelica Christi is what we have been calling 
cognitio integra. This is what Thomas has in mind when he abbreviates the long form as 
"cognitio evangelica" (#103). This paradigm form of human cognition of God comes in several 
forms, among them, fides.40  
8. Since we have seen that the cognitio Dei functions only in the presence of grace, we know 
something about the conditions under which we can have an Aristotelian science whose subject 
is God. For an Aristotelian science requires that propositions be put in order so as to deliver 
effective knowledge —"true cognition, which leads human beings to the good" (In Rom. 1:18, 
#122). For Aristotle, a science just is that structuring of propositions—as in demonstrations—to 
render the mind formed or structured in accord with the form or structure of reality. For sacred 
doctrine, Aristotelian science requires some wrenching.  
For it has been the further point of Thomas's entire exposition of Romans 1 —and indeed of the 
eleven following chapters that will carry him to chapter 12—to explicate the necessity and 
sufficiency, for the integral and effective knowledge of God, of the evangelica gratia (#97) that 
he ascribes to Christ. Evangelica gratia Christi, to invent a technical term, specifies the 
conditions under which Thomas thinks human beings can, through restoration and elevation of 
their natures, enjoy effective cognitio Dei. Thomas causes Aristotle's notion of a science to serve 
sacred doctrine and not the other way around. For Thomas has set things up so that the more 
scientific it is, the more sacred doctrine looks to the gospel of Christ.41 Taking the Aristotelian 
concept of science "captive in obedience to Christ," as ST 1.1.8 interprets II Cor. 10:5, requires 
the following further distinction.  
9. Since Aristotle's language of scientia as of things seen and the Bible's language of faith as of 
things not seen (II-II.4.1) makes a division, then when the natural cognition of God becomes 
effective by grace, its effectiveness belongs on the side of faith, not on the side of scientia.42 For 
it is by faith that we are united to God (1.12.13 ad 1), and faith that motivates and structures 
(infuses and habituates) change in the human soul. That is the logic of Thomas's Romans 
Commentary. 
The first question of the Summa gives the following account of that logic.43 It is not because of 
the account in the Summa that things go that way in the Romans commentary; it is because of the 
account in Paul. Like Aristotle, Thomas maintains a secondary and penultimate distinction 
between the structured discipline (like German Wissenschaft) and the structured habit (like 
German Erkenntnis) of effective cognition, and unlike Aristotle Thomas introduces, in sacred 
doctrine, an additional terminological distinction for two reasons. 1) The disciplined or scientific 
character of sacred doctrine is borrowed by revelation from the sdentici enjoyed by God and the 
blessed: it does not inhere in the human intellect in this life (ST 1.1.3). The work of the theory of 
subalternation is to claim the title "scientia" for a discipline that cannot, of its own habit, so 
change the soul as to save it, that cannot, in short, reach its purpose. Meanwhile (2) the habitual 
or soul-structuring character of the believer is not gained from studying the science of sacred 
doctrine, since its subject lies outside the realm of the humanly comprehensible; the habit is 
infused. Because sacred doctrine seeks a source of intelligibility for the world that lies outside 
the world, and a source of intelligibility for the mind that lies beyond its powers, its real and 
mental instantiations remain apart, its discipline borrowed, its habit infused. Thus Thomas must 
retain "scieniia" for the structuring of the discipline, in virtue of the reliability of the reality of 
revelation, and "fides" for the structuring of the soul, in virtue of the gratuity of salvation. The 
discipline deserves the title of "science" by leaning upon the science of God and the blessed 
(1.1.2), but the habit is denied the title of science because sacred doctrine is a science unable to 
operate by itself io structure the soul; its operating comes by faith, and even so operation is 
denied (by the invention of the word "cooperation") to faith, since faith is a movement of the 
soul by God (HI. 111.2). 
So too demonstration differs in this structuring of cognition from others. Jesus Christ structures 
the discipline by being himself the real light, the new feature of reality, that demands a new real 
science; Jesus Christ (as a human being) is himself the primary demonstration in the proemium 
to question 2, and he is himself the primary state of affairs to which other states of affairs point 
forward and backward according to the theory of scripture as sacred doctrine's authority at the 
end of question 1 (ST 1.1.10). At the same time Jesus Christ structures the soul by dwelling 
within it. The intellectual counterpart of that indwelling, by which God unites us to God 
precisely as One unknown (1.12.13 ad 1; cf. In Rom. 1:19, #114) is not scientia but faith. Thus 
even as we study the scientia of sacred doctrine we become not its scientists but its believers. 
Thus the necessity and sole effectiveness of the gratia evangelica Christi in the Romans 
commentary. The Aristotelian structure of the soul does accompany faith, and the Aristotelian 
structure of the discipline does belong to sacred doctrine: both arise from the same structure of 
reality understood as the real first principle of an Aristotelian science. And the connection 
therefore between the real first principle and the structures of discipline and habit that follow 
from it is rightly called a demonstration. But that first principle and its demonstration, both in the 
extramental discipline and in the intramental habit, are both Jesus Christ. Sacred doctrine 
assumes metaphysics into christology.44  
Thomas is not kidding when he distinguishes, in the very first question of the Summa (ST 1.1.1 
ad 2) the formality of the theology that belongs to metaphysics from the theology that belongs to 
sacred doctrine. And yet here again the appellation of Aristotelian science is justified for sacred 
doctrine just by reference to Jesus Christ. For only by reference to Jesus Christ does sacred 
doctrine keep together the structures that come together in Aristotelian episteme: the structure of 
reality, the structure of the academic discipline, and the structure of the soul to be formed in 
accord with its end and desire, in this case salvation.45  
Thus it is no accident, and no expression of mere pious sentiment, that Thomas calls the 
humanity of Christ via and demonstratio (ST I, proemium to q. 2, and III, prologue). Those 
words most fittingly portray the figure of science put at sacred doctrine's disposal. They 
represent the language appropriate when sacred doctrine trains philosophy seriously as anelila 
theologiae. They do not merely turn water into wine, they make argument flesh. 
Ill Thomas and Barth  
In a commentary on Thomas's argument461 have tried to show, and in Part I of this article I have 
tried coherently to assert, that the natural cognition of God functions properly—that is, is able to 
execute cognition's proper office of shaping the soul—only in the presence of grace. Natural 
cognition of God without grace is an anomaly, a residual, defective "cognition," so called only by 
courtesy that proves irrelevant to salvation except negatively, in increasing human fault, in 
showing our cognition of God to be a has-been. Natural cognition of God without grace is a self-
consuming artifact, unnatural, denatured, a paradox. Meanwhile, the praise of the natural 
knowledge of God without grace that some seem to detect in talk of preambles I identified as a 
misreading based on taking the Contra gentiles rather than question one of the Summa as the 
governing text; preambles function differently, I argued, in the last stage of Thomas's 
development.47 They get transmuted into faith. The cosmological arguments fulfill the charge of 
sacred doctrine to leave no part of the world God-forsaken. The reading sought to take better 
account of the integrity of an Aristotelian science. 
1. A Barthian objection and Thomas's reconstructed reply  
Let us raise the stakes by pursuing the comparison with Karl Barth. Consider the following 
contrast between Barth and Thomas proposed by one of the most convinced and convincing 
Barthians, George Hunsinger.48 The recent date of his study—1991—reminds us that the reading 
he offers of Thomas on nature is still current. He serves as careful and interesting example of a 
whole class of possible critics. 
By reviewing Aquinas's discussion of the justification of the unrighteous, the contrast 
between the two theologians [Thomas and Barth] can be sharpened. In what sense, 
Aquinas asks [I-II.113.10.], might this justification be considered to be a miracle? Three 
possible senses of miracle are distinguished. First, insofar as a miracle is something 
which can be done only by divine power, justification can be considered a miracle. 
Second, insofar as a miracle is something which actualizes a possibility not inherent in 
nature, justification cannot be considered a miracle. Finally, insofar as a miracle is 
something which operates outside the usual order of cause and effect, justification may or 
may not be considered a miracle, depending on the circumstances. (In case where an 
instantaneous conversion actualizes perfect righteousness in an individual all at once, as 
occurred with St. Paul, justification can be considered a miracle; otherwise, righteousness 
is perfected within the individual by grace as it operates inside the usual order of cause 
and effect.)  
It is the second of these points which provides the best contrast with Barth. Barth agrees 
with Aquinas that the justification of the unrighteous person is something which can 
occur only by divine power, but disagrees that in justification (and thus in salvation) 
grace actualizes a possibility inherent in human nature. Barth considers justification to be 
a miracle in the very sense that Aquinas rules out. Indeed, Barth must do so, precisely 
because he disallows a key premise articulated by Aquinas in this text, namely, that 'the 
soul is by nature capable of or open to grace.' 
But such an assumption, in Thomas, does not impugn grace but lauds it. It does not render 
"nature" incoherent but preserves for it the possibility of coherence, does not tie God's hands but 
bears witness to God's steadfast remaining true to God's own self, to God's creative purposes and 
elevating promises. It does not make grace a human creature but preserves nature as a divine 
mercy. Yet the standard charge is serious: "If this premise is granted as used by Aquinas, divine 
grace and human freedom must necessarily be conceived as interdependent in the work of 
salvation."  
It is true to say that Thomas interdefines nature and grace. That is because we cannot understand 
properly functioning nature apart from grace, and we cannot recognize nature, either as it 
concretely subsists in the faithful or as it concretely subsists in the unfaithful, without knowing 
what its end is, a purpose that God graciously bestows upon it in elevating it. This much any 
Barthian should grant: we ought to define nature in terms of grace because it takes Jesus Christ 
to tell us what nature is. That is also the burden of the insistence of question one of the Summa 
upon the praecognitum finis, something foreknown about the human end—which is finally the 
humanity of Jesus Christ—as necessary for understanding nature in terms of what God has in 
store for it. But to say that the conception of nature depends upon grace is different from saying 
"divine grace and human freedom must necessarily be conceived as interdependent in the work 
of salvation." That would be so only if human freedom contributed something independent in the 
work of salvation. But that contribution is different from cooperation, precisely because 
cooperation is entirely dependent upon grace.  
"Cooperation" language merely ensures that we do not do good wnwil-lingly. Barth too requires 
that we do the good "gerne/' eagerly; it does not change the point that Thomas deploys a 
technical term and Barth does not. If God moves the motive, that does not impugn but praises 
grace: "our mind both moves and is moved ... whence the entire business [operatio] belongs to 
grace" and not, that is, to us as opposed to grace (I-II.111.2c and ad 2). The only alternative 
would be a sort of nature that could not undergo movement by God without becoming something 
else. Protestant thinking sometimes goes that way: anything moved by God must be by grace; 
grace and nature are mutually exclusive categories; therefore nothing moved by God can be 
natural. But such a nature would be almost incomprehensible to Thomas. The sort of thing that 
could not undergo movement by God without becoming something else could not be a creature, 
which was made to be God-moved. Or natures made for God could not be moved by God as their 
end, so that they not only fall away from God, but escape from God into nothingness. The 
objection eliminates creation by making it something immovable, and such absolutes are either 
divine or demonic in a non-Christian way. The objection, that is, resolves creation either into the 
sort of non-critter that a Manichean evil would be, or into the sort of non-critter49 that God is.  
For these purposes, therefore, it is misleading to abstract nature from the context of the divine 
plan and the concrete (supernatural) human end. Perhaps it is strictly possible to define nature 
apart from grace, in terms of human ordering, but given the concrete human ordering beyond 
itself, it is speculation of a pernicious kind, about how God might have treated us if God had not 
loved us as God does, and of a kind that Thomas disparages. In sacred doctrine at least, since it 
considers all things precisely as ordered to God, nature cannot appropriately be defined apart 
from grace. Grace does not however for that reason get defined in terms of nature. Rather for that 
very reason grace remains independent of nature, just because nature could not exercise any 
independent causality over against grace. The only causality that operates toward God is the 
causality by which God, working either within or without the will, calls all creatures according to 
their natures into the divine communion. Barth makes that move too, when he interprets creation 
as the "external ground of the covenant," and the covenant as the "internal ground of creation."50  
Hunsinger would presumably press his point. He would say that the very language of "capacity" 
and "openness" surreptitiously defines not only nature but grace too. He could appeal to the logic 
of question and answer in his reply. 
The rejoinder to the point pressed makes both a concession and a demurrer. It is true that 
language works in a way that constrains answers, to some extent, in terms of the questions. 
Human beings first understand the gospel stories in time, for example, because they have learned 
language from their human parents. But that does not mean that the truth of the gospel stories or 
the significance of the concepts they convey depend logically upon how they have learned 
certain truths or concepts. Rather Thomas would say that the truths or concepts that come to 
them inherited logically owe their truth or helpfulness to their participation in the first truth. Thus 
the fact that language makes the semantic range of words like "capability" and "openness" 
depend both upon what is open and what it is open to does not mean that the facts arrange 
themselves that way.  
Second, Thomas would defend the sense of "capax" as entirely negative. Hunsinger's 
qualification "as used by Aquinas" undermines his case: the case fares better with the 
qualification "as read by others." Thomas denies that nature is capable of grace in the sense 
Hunsinger rightly fears, that of finitum capax infiniti, or the finite capable of the infinite. Rather 
Thomas regards nature as capable of grace in the sense of God's plan to save that which God 
created, or to carry through what God had begun. It is none other than God's own purpose that 
God saves. Thomas adduces a quotation from Augustine to clarify the remark in just that way. 
"Naturally the soul is open to grace" gets glossed as "is open to God by grace." Nature is only 
open to grace by grace.  
Hunsinger surreptitiously assumes that nature could be open to grace only by itself, since "graced 
nature" seems like a contradiction in terms to many Protestants. But it does not to Thomas. Grace 
clears its own room. The word seeks to exclude the violence to nature that Barth also wants to 
exclude. But the misunderstanding, as we have seen, goes so deep as to need a 
reconceptualization. I shall propose two. 
1. Hunsinger grants a concession earlier on the same page. It does not go far enough. Better, it 
goes back and forth—all the more reason for a reconceptualization. It says: "Although human 
freedom is certainly [in Thomas] in some sense conceptually subsequent to and dependent on 
divine grace, in another (if perhaps secondary) sense divine grace is nonetheless subsequent to 
and dependent on human freedom. By contrast, as previously suggested, Barth's position on such 
matters is always one which repudiates a scheme of conceptual interdependence in favor of a 
scheme in which divine grace cannot be understood except as conceptually prior to and entirely 
independent of human freedom." Hunsinger might better have written not "by contrast," but 
rather "in a similar way." The "other, secondary sense" in which for Thomas divine grace is 
conceptually subsequent to and dependent on human freedom is just another way in which 
Thomas reverses the usual polarities of conceptions so that the aspects of human freedom on 
which grace seems to depend (the usual suspects of the theology of controversy)—like 
cooperation, merit, preparation, perseverance, reason—become so many ways in which Thomas 
takes an apparent pretension to human autonomy, analyses it, and finds grace. The language of 
subsequence and dependence tends finally to break down. For as long as the language of divine 
and human "agency" is in place it becomes difficult to teep up the task of conceiving of them as 
on two different levels. Yet everyone would insist, whether via an analogy of being or via an 
analogy of faith, on the distinction, because thinking of them as on two different levels keeps 
getting undermined by thinking of them as two levels of the same sort ofthing. We do not want 
to give up the double language of agency—Hunsinger makes it, in a final chapter, his test case—
but we misread Thomas if we do not notice how at every opportunity he puts up roadblocks 
against the conclusion that in comparing divine and human agency we have two levels of the 
same sort of thing. Take merit-talk as an example. "Merit" gets defined as if the dishes of a 
balance that would weigh us became buckets to uplift us (I-II.114). I take the images from 
George Herbert, whom I find almost perfectly to represent, willy-nilly, Thomas's integration of 
the biblical merit-talk into a sola gratia scheme: 
Justice [II]  
The dishes of thy balance seem to gape  
Like two great pits;  
The beam and scape  
Did like some torturing engine show;  
Thy hand above did burn and glow,  
Daunting the stoutest hearts, and proudest wits.  
But now that Christ's pure veil presents the sight,  
I see no fears:  
Thy hand is white,  
Thy scales like buckets, which attend  
And interchangeably descend,  
Lifting to heaven from this well of tears.  
Thomas too practices such reversals at every turn.  
It is more helpful to think of Thomas as treating the will as a place where God also works. 
Protestants tend to think of the will as a God-forsaken place. Thomas thinks of the will as 
another locus of divine activity. Better: "the will" is the name for the place where God primarily 
addresses, engages, and involves human beings. "The will" is also the name for the place where 
human beings primarily rebel against God. For that very reason God's activity in that place, 
God's taking that field, salvation's occurrence and working out just there can only be the work of 
grace alone. Thus the dense and elegant formulation of Bernard of Clairvaux: "The entire work is 
in the will precisely because the entire work is from grace."51 
2. Imagine the nature-grace debate as a debate about what class of stories in the gospel to use to 
explicate the question of what it means to "hear" the word of God. Take Protestants as tending to 
imagine it this way. There are two candidates: the parables and the healings.52 In the parables it is 
assumed (except perhaps in Mark) that human beings have an innate capacity to hear and 
understand: The one who has ears to hear, let that one hear. So it makes sense to talk about a 
human faculty, analogous to hearing, that takes in the word of God, a capacity for grace. That, 
Protestants take it, is the Catholic view.  
But that view, imagine our Protestant continuing, is too optimistic. It does not take account of the 
stories in which the hearers notoriously fail to understand, and of the version in which Mark says 
(4:12) that Jesus speaks in parables in order that the hearers will not understand. Mention is 
made of human capacity only to emphasize human incapacity. Mention is made of public parable 
only to emphasize the private explanations to the disciples, so as to preserve divine freedom with 
regard to who understands and who does not. So the parable model of human response to God's 
word, or, if you like, of the human cognition of God, breaks down. Better to turn to another.  
Take the Protestants, then, to see themselves as preferring a second model, that of the healing 
stories. Protestants want to emphasize the reversal by which it is none other than the blind who 
see, the deaf who hear, the lame who leap for joy. Similarly in Mark it is never the disciples, 
even with their parable explanations, who are said in the indicative mood to "follow Jesus": they 
are only commanded to do so, in the imperative, especially when like Peter they stray: "Follow 
after me, Satan." It is not until the episode after Jesus's sharp rebuke of Peter that Mark comes to 
say (10:52) of the healed Bartimaeus alone (the one whom Jesus had found blind and screaming 
by the side of the road), simply and without qualification, in the indicative rather than the 
imperative mode: "and he followed him."53 It is those stories, the Protestant would say, to which 
we ought to turn to see what human capacities are like. There are none. The gospels describe 
them as incapacities: as blindnesses, deafnesses, lamenesses. They wait upon a miracle also in 
the second sense of the typology of miracles that Hunsinger quoted from Thomas above. To 
explicate blindness, deafness, and lameness as "openness and capability" flies in their face. The 
gospel knows eyes closed, ears stopped, legs crippled. Far better to take Barth's tack: that 
possibility follows from actuality. Better to talk about the sight of the sighted than of the "sight" 
of the blind. The latter is what we have seen Thomas up to in the Romans commentary: talking 
about the "cognition" of the ignorant.  
That, I take it, explicates a certain sort of Protestant argument so far.  
Thomas has a rejoinder. First he would observe that it cannot be wrong to speak of things that we 
cannot understand. The blind, the deaf, the lame are still defined, on the level of biblical 
language, in terms of the capacities they lack, even if it does, as everyone admits, take grace to 
restore them. When we hear about the "ears of the deaf unstopped, the eyes of the blind opened," 
it is indeed ears and eyes that they possess, their own nature restored.54 If we outlawed all talk of 
nature—of eyes and ears and legs—we might misread the biblical healing stories as contrary to 
nature, as "bestowing" upon us unhuman capacities that could only violate us. Thomas is afraid 
that in the absence of nature-talk the healing stories would look as if Jesus had bestowed upon 
human beings not their own nature in return but faculties alien to them: not sight but radar, not 
ears but antennae, not two good legs but six. Absent talk of nature, Thomas might fear, it 
becomes hard to distinguish metanoia from metamorphosis, the gospels from Kafka. It is the 
absurdity of grace's turning human beings into cockroaches, and not its independence, that 
Thomas wants to deny when he says that the human soul is open to grace "naturaliter."  
We can even say something about the positive point of Thomas's talk about human faculties in 
terms of these stories. The characters in the gospel healing stories remain, by God's prevenient 
mercy, able to use the words that form a request for healing even as they remain also 
unacquainted with the state that they request. The presence of Jesus prompts the blind to ask for 
sight even without having experienced it. So there seems to be a place for talk, for linguistic 
place-holders, even where we do not have discursive intelligibility of the quid est to which we 
refer.  
The full integrity of this talk depends, to be sure, upon its coming from a person who enjoys 
effective use of the faculty mentioned. Similarly the full integrity of the cognition of God 
depends upon the propositions inhering in a mind united by faith with the first truth, and in that 
case the cognition is effective in the soul (is formed faith). But language retains a residual sense 
just when we know the use of the words. (Most human language proceeds in this mode, which is 
why Wittgenstein is helpful.) It retains that residual sense not because truth inheres in words and 
propositions, but because the usage in the community is not entirely divorced from the reality 
wherein the truth inheres. The requests of the gospel blind, deaf, and lame to be healed make 
sense because the sighted, hearing, and walking keep those words alive and in contact with the 
form of life in which they enjoy their full integrity. Similarly, talk of the knowledge of God 
proceeds not because the cognition inheres in the propositions, or even, finally, because even one 
human being could, over a long period of time, reach some truth about God, and keep the 
community in touch with reality, but rather because God does not abandon us utterly. That God 
does not abandon us utterly means just that God mercifully preserves our nature from entire non-
existence. God preserves some community with us, even that of God's wrath (Vulgate: ira)—
which Thomas glosses as God's vindicta, vindication, or God's desire for self-justification {In 
Rom.l:18, #110) as the promising God (In Rom.l:17, #102)—that we encounter the cognition of 
God that human beings have "by nature." It is certainly not in virtue of something independently 
human— which if not meaningless would have to mean that which refuses, against nature, to 
depend upon grace, and that which therefore blinds, deafens, lames, and kills—that God, 
according to Thomas, preserves eyes, ears, legs, and lives. It could not be, as hyper-Protestants 
claim, that Thomas has God preserve nature in virtue of anything other than its utter dependence 
upon grace. It is in virtue of nothing other than God's plan that in the meantime we retain only 
miraculously usable eyes, ears, legs, and lives. God preserves the blind for no other reason than 
that they may see, the deaf that they may hear, the lame that they may leap for joy: in the same 
way God preserves nature denatured to be restored and elevated, cognition dead that as faith it 
may live and have life abundantly. That is the pattern that Thomas seeks positively to preserve.  
"Mainly, [Barth] believes, grace would not be grace—it would not be sovereign, free, 
gratuitous—if human freedom were not conceptually subsequent to and entirely dependent on 
it," Hunsinger concludes. Thomas believes that too, without qualification. Human openness to 
salvation, expressed either as Unfällen reason or as willing cooperation, belongs on the side not 
of our contribution to a redemption from a sin wherein we cannot help ourselves, which is for 
Thomas too a contradiction in terms, but on the side of the persistent mercifulness toward us and 
faithfulness ad intra of God in the divine plan, a plan to elevate this creature, the very one whom 
God created open to friendship with God, and the very one that rebelled against it. It is the blind 
who see, the deaf who hear, the lame who leap.  
So far the Barthians. 
2. Assessment and significance of the hypothesis: Thomas and Barth in convergence on Romans 
1?  
Let us pursue the comparison with a return to the Shorter Commentary. I confine myself to 
Barth's comments on 1:18-32, some six pages. I regard them as parallel to longer discussions in 
the Dogmatics. Their brevity, their commentary-order and their commentary-context, parallel to 
Thomas's, give those comments great advantages for my purpose over the comments of the 
Dogmatics, without loss.55  
Barth begins with a paragraph of rhetorical questions that he then devotes half the exposition, 
some three pages, to answering in the negative:  
Does Paul mean a second or even a first revelation apart from the one mentioned in 1.17 when 
now he suddenly introduces a revelation of God's wrath against all the ungodliness (irreverence) 
and iniquity (insubordination) of human beings, viz. of the Gentiles (1.18-32) and the Jews (2.1-
3.20)? Has he abandoned his office as a messenger of the Gospel for a while in order to speak in 
the first place in an entirely different capacity as a religious interpreter of the human situation as 
such, as a Christian student of the philosophy of religion and of history? This section has often 
been interpreted as if this were the case. Then that whole rather long section 1.18-3.20 would 
mean that Paul—as bad preachers are admittedly in the habit of doing—is leading off with a 
lengthy discussion of something quite different from his text, i.e. from the matter which he has 
already indicated clearly and unmistakably. Can we regard him as capable of that?56  
The practiced reader of Barth will gather from the tenor of those questions the tenor of the 
answer, just as the practiced reader of Thomas's articles will be able to predict a lot about the 
respondeo from the objections. That Barth will reassert Paul's office as an apostle and his 
standpoint as one who confronts the Gentiles with the gospel of Jesus Christ (p. 27) is almost 
obvious. What is not obvious is why Barth perpetrates just the same sort of misreading against 
Thomas as he ridicules in readers of Paul. Thomas's advocates and detractors, Barth chief among 
the latter, act as if Thomas had "abandoned his office as a messenger of the gospel for a while in 
order to speak in the first place as a religious interpreter of the human situation as such, as a 
Christian student of the philosophy of religion and of history." We have seen that the description 
applies no more to Thomas than it does to Paul. That is also true for many of the same reasons. 
In fact we may take Barth's defense of Paul to apply tout court to the proffered reading of 
Thomas. The overall shape of Barth's argument fits.  
A number of particular features stand out.  
1. Barth like Thomas makes God's wrath a form of God's grace. For Thomas God's ira is God's 
vindicta, at once the self-justification by which God maintains the integrity of God's promises 
and the deliverance according to which God carries out the divine intention in creation (In 
Rom.l:17-18, esp. ##102 and 109). From Barth, similarly, we learn that Paul "sees the Gentiles 
as well as the Jews in the reflected light of that fire of God's wrath which is the fire of [God's] 
love," and that that love has endured "for a long time, yea always, since the creation of the 
world" (p. 28).  
2. Barth like Thomas sees Paul as ascribing a knowledge of God to the Gentiles (whatever its 
status) in order to stake out as it were a certain field. Thomas wants to render all true human 
cognition incorporable into sacred doctrine, wants to treat all things as revelabilia (ST 1.1.3) and 
so to leave no realm God-forsaken. We could take Thomas therefore to be proposing the natural 
cognition of God to be an answer precisely to this question of Barth's: "How can the Gospel be 
God's almighty power (1.16), if the Gentiles could exculpate themselves by saying that God is a 
stranger to them, that they are living in some forgotten corner of the world, where God is not 
God or cannot be known as God ...?" (pp. 28-29). Both Thomas (In Rom. 1:20a, #115) and Barth 
want to deny that question's presupposition. Yet it is in providing an articulation of that denial 
that Thomas's concept of concrete nature, nature always already shot through with grace, finds 
its point and purpose. It is a nature from which God has never entirely withdrawn the grace 
intended to elevate it, sustaining the creation, and here appearing as God's wrath: This nature is 
the "place" in which the Gentiles live, in which it would be as false for Thomas as for Barth to 
say that "they are living in some forgotten corner of the world, where God is not God or cannot 
be known as God." That is the sense in which nature is graced, in which God refuses to leave us 
alone. Barth imagines that that nature or place is otherwise for Thomas; he continues to ask, 
expecting a negative answer, "if there were such a thing as a self-contained Gentile world, 
established, secure and justified in itself" (p. 29). But Thomas's concrete nature is precisely not 
self-contained, precisely not "established, secure and justified in itself." To have security 
("fiducia") in ourselves and "ascribe good," or justify ourselves is for Thomas too precisely our 
Gentile sin (In Rom. 1:21, #129). Rather concrete nature is contained in grace, established in 
grace, and first secure and justified in grace, even if that grace first appears as God's delivering 
vindication. Barth's denial of such a Gentile world, a God-forsaken one, is the affirmation of a 
natural world, when we understand "nature" as Thomas does. It is the world in which, Barth and 
Thomas would agree, God's grace blows as wrath (vindicta Dei). And it is the same world in 
which, Barth and Thomas would agree, God's grace blows as gospel ("evangelica gratia" In 
Rom. 1:16, #97-99, which is of Christ, #102). One world, one grace. Barth defines that world 
negatively as one unforgotten by the grace of Christ; Thomas defines that world positively as one 
where the grace of Christ is necessary and sufficient (#109); so that even the positive definition 
belongs in the inalienable context of grace, and has never, in fact, existed for its own sake.  
3. Barth like Thomas is able, when it suits him, to distinguish between effective and ineffective 
cognitions of God—and even to preserve the word "knowledge" or "Erkenntnis" for the latter. 
"In spite of their objective know-ledge of God57 they have not rendered to [God] the honor and 
gratitude they owe ..." (p. 29). Usually Barth reserves Erkenntnis for knowledge as a concrete 
formation of the soul, complete with obedience (Gehorsamkeit) and thankfulness (Dankbarkeit) 
much as Thomas reserves cognitio vera for the form that "leads human beings toward the good" 
(In Rom. 1:18, #112), which Thomas tends in the Romans commentary to follow Paul in 
identifying with justice (#112) and gratitude (e.g., In Rom. 1:8, #75; 1:21, #127); that is how it 
works in the Church Dogmatics too. But here, evidently, he is open to Thomas's way of dividing 
things up, and he finds it useful, perhaps even necessary, to resort to it, precisely in order to do 
justice to the usage of Paul. And that openness—so rare for Barth to assert, so difficult for Barth 
to give an account of—is just the place where Thomas anticipates the need of an articulate 
account and seeks, in the service of explicating precisely the necessity and efficacy and power of 
what he calls gratia evangelica, to supply one.  
4. Thomas like Barth insists that, as Barth puts it, "Paul does not dream of paying the Gentiles 
anything resembling a compliment and of trying to find in their religions some point of contact 
for the understanding of the Gospel; on the contrary he is merely and simply calling them to faith 
in God's verdict" (p. 28). That is the reason why Thomas can turn around and characterize  
the cognition he has so carefully accounted for as one that effectively the Gentiles lack, because 
it paradoxically manages to leave them unformed. As Preller puts it, "Such 'cognition' of God 
that philosophy can produce is merely the clarification of what was there all the time—a felt 
ignorance/'58 That is why Thomas insists on accounting for human natural cognition of God in its 
full, salvific, graced rather than residual and defective form, why he describes it in Paul himself 
as involving "all virtues," as specified by charity (Proh, #1), and why he describes it even at 
Romans 1:20 as objectively trinitarian, whether the Gentiles recognize it as such or not (#120): 
so that he has a contrast by which to render the Gentiles' relative cognition defective and their 
relative ignorance culpable {In Rom. 1:21, #127).  
5. Thomas like Barth insists that this culpability leaves the Gentiles in a situation from which 
they cannot free themselves. "[Paul] starts by referring to the best the Gentiles have, or claim to 
have: their religion, which consists in one great confusion between the Creator and [the 
Creator's] creatures. If there is any position from which no bridge can possibly be built to the 
Gospel, to the knowledge of the living God, then this is it! Human religion, as radically 
distinguished from belief in God's revelation, always originates and consists in this confusion: in 
the mistaken confidence in which [human beings] want to decide for [themselves] who and what 
God is, which can only produce this confusion, i.e. idolatry. This mistaken self-confidence is the 
actual object of God's wrath." The contrast Thomas makes, parallel to Barth's, is the one he 
describes when he writes, "In their thoughts they became empty, in so far as they had trust 
[fiducial] in themselves, and not in God" (In Rom. 1:21, #129) and when he says "For the 
Apostle appears ... to touch ... natural theology, which the philosophers in the world observe, 
worshiping parts of the world, and with respect to this he says: And they worshipped and served 
the creature rather than the Creator" (#149 in fin.). For the natural cognition of God is neutral 
only when Thomas considers it in abstraction from the mind that holds it, and since Thomas, 
unlike the twentieth century, defines truth not in terms of propositions but in terms of the 
adequation of a thing to the mind, that is a fairly odd thing to do. In actual human minds Thomas 
evaluates the knowledge of God according to what use the human being puts it, which is to say 
the will, and there all the language of praise and blame is at home.59 So Paul could "pay the 
Gentiles a compliment" only with regard to their use of their knowledge; but they use it ill, 
"subtracting from God's power and scientia ... but rather they ascribed their good things to their 
own ingenuity and power ... the light of wisdom having been taken away" (In Rom. 1:21, 
##127,129,130).  
6. Both Barth and Thomas want to talk about a refusal of God to abandon human beings, which 
Thomas explicates with the concept of nature and Barth explicates with his talk of a world 
unforgotten, as well as about a delivering up of human beings to their own sinful desires. 
Thomas can make the distinction as one between the will that sin affects directly (the delivering 
up) and the relatively upright powers of reason that sin affects indirectly (the leaving 
unabandoned) in every concrete human being. Barth replaces distinction with dialectic, so that 
talk of God's not abandoning the Gentiles to any place where God is not God gets juxtaposed 
with talk of God's abandoning the Gentiles to their own desires. That dialectic is saved from 
contradiction just if we read it in Thomas's terms: the place where God does not abandon them is 
the place God's grace sustains for them in their concrete nature, and by the grace of God it is in 
just that God-sustained place that their falling down occurs.  
7. Barth like Thomas insists that "human beings are without excuse, because, having the 
knowledge of God, they still do not render [God] honour and thanks as God. It is unquestionable 
that knowledge of God is here ascribed to the human being in the cosmos, and knowability is 
ascribed to God" (CD II/l, p. 119, translation slightly modified). Of course this knowledge, in 
Barth as in Thomas, is no independent knowledge, but depends, for Barth, upon the "revelation 
of the grace of God in Jesus Christ," as for Thomas upon the evangelica gratia Christi. And for 
Thomas as for Barth it proves effective only as that knowledge is "fundamentally surpassed, but 
at the same time also included, in a higher knowledge, and, despite its limitation, raised into this 
higher knowledge" (CD II/l, p. 116)—much as for Thomas too the natural cognition of God is 
taken up into sacred doctrine by the technical means of parsing it as revelabile or subordinating it 
to the primary demonstration in the humanity of Jesus Christ.  
8. Both Barth and Thomas want to affirm that what God primarily reveals is God's own self in 
Jesus Christ. For Barth Jesus Christ is the primary form of the threefold Word of God, incarnate, 
written, and preached. For Thomas Jesus Christ must also be the real, light-giving aspect of the 
Revelation in order to ground the new scientia of sacred doctrine as other revelations grant to 
other Aristotelian disciplines the first principles that give them rise. According to the Summa's 
account of "proceeding from first principles," sacred doctrine is not a deficient science for 
proceeding from Revelation: it is rather for that very reason a proper science; indeed, it is science 
par excellence. To proceed from first principles means, in the Summa's version of Aristotle, to 
proceed from formal "revelations." All science arises from small-"r" revelations; sacred doctrine 
too arises from a revelation; therefore sacred doctrine counts as science, even science par 
excellence.60 For both Barth and Thomas scripture is the place from which one mounts 
arguments, for Barth as the second form of the Word of God, for Thomas as the proposi-tional 
form of the first principles to which sacred doctrine must attend and return in order to exercise its 
scientific character. And for both Barth and Thomas the scripture witnesses, whether as the 
Word's secondary form, or as scientia's propositional aspect, to Jesus Christ as the argument that 
trumps or absorbs all others. True human words from the secular sphere "are true in their 
supposed and implied, if not always immediately apparent, connection with the totality of Jesus 
Christ and his prophecy, and therefore as they indirectly point to this, or as this indirectly 
declares itself in them" (CD TV/3, p. 123).61 That statement could well serve as a summary of the 
move that Thomas makes in articulating sacred doctrine's overarching unity and integrity in 
question 1, or in construing cognitio naturalis in the context of God's delivering wrath and the 
gospel grace of Christ in Romans 1.  
This is all by no means to deny that large and important differences remain between Thomas and 
Barth. But it is to say that they are differences that distinguish different human beings on the side 
of the angels, rather than one on the side of the angels and one on the side of the Antichrist. To 
find Thomas and Barth in convergence in their commentaries on Romans—not just on any book, 
but on Romans—is to find them in convergence in the place where for both the Summa and the 
Dogmatics the account of the natural knowledge of God is at home. It should dispense, too, with 
many objections that Protestants may still harbor toward that account. "Spitzenleistung/' indeed!  
The account raises new objections, to be sure. To explain how both students of Barth and 
students of Thomas came to agree on their divergence would require an account of how both 
Barth and Vatican I represented opposing responses to Kant. That is a topic for another day.62 
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